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Jenkins: What Is the National Labor Relations Board?

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD?
JOSEPH ALTON JENKINS"

"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed. The
law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law.
The National Labor Relations Board 1 is now at the high point
of its history. Although from its beginning it has been an important
nerve center in the economic and political life of the United States,
relatively recent Supreme Court decisions have catapulted it into a
position of predominant importance. 2 Further, the Act of 1959 may
have enhanced rather than diminished the responsibilities under
the law which the Labor Board was already discharging. Its ability
to meet the challenge posed by an enhanced role in the life of this
*B.A. 1939, University of Utah; LL.B. 1944, Georgetown University; Field Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 1948-51; Chief of Enforcement and Litigation Branch, Region 10, National Wage Stabilization Board, 1951-53; Member
of National Labor Relations Board, 1956 to date; author of numerous articles on
labor law.
'Hereafter called the NLRB, or the Board, interchangeably.
2
0n March 25, 1957, the Supreme Court issued three decisions holding that
Congress, by vesting in the NLRB jurisdiction over labor relations matters "affecting commerce" displaced "state power to deal with such matters where the Board
has declined or obviously would decline to exercise its jurisdiction, but has ceded
jurisdiction pursuant to the proviso to §10 (a) of the National Labor Relations
Act." Guss v. Utah LRB, 353 U.S. 1, 3 (1957). See also Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butchers v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957). All three opinions are by Warren,
C.J., Burton and Clark, JJ., dissenting, and Whittaker, J., not participating. The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 affects the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act) by virtue of Titles II and
VII, all of which will be hereinafter more fully explained.
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nation remains to be demonstrated. If it is able to meet the demands
now being made, it may be anticipated that it will develop into an
institution of even greater benefit to the country. (Many people
have seriously questioned whether it has been of any benefit, but
the writer feels that it or a similar institution is absolutely essential
to the proper functioning of an industrial democracy.) If it fails to
meet these demands it may look forward to old age, decay, and
eventual death. Its flexibility and adaptability as an institution dedicated to making labor law a living part of the framework of the
economic life of our country are now undergoing a severe test. The
very fact that the author has been asked to write an article on this
subject indicates that many people are aware of the increasing importance of the Board as an "Agency of the United States." 3 In a
sense, the Board's flexibility and adaptability are directly dependent
upon a widespread public understanding, particularly in the legal
profession, of its function in administering what is popularly known
4
as the Taft-Hartley Act.
Perhaps it would be best to begin with the beginning and start
from the day the National Labor Relations Act was born.
GENESIs

The National Labor Relations Act was a child of the great depression of 1929. It was born July 5, 1935- more than twenty-four
years ago. It was a sickly infant whose chances of survival appeared
slim indeed. During the first month of its existence, a voluntary
committee of more than fifty distinguished lawyers advised the public
aNational Labor Relations Act §3 (a), as amended, 61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C.

§153 (a) (1958).
4When the National Labor Relations Act was first passed, it was popularly
known as the Wagner Act. When it was amended in August of 1947, it became
known as the Taft-Hartley Act. The Taft-Hartley Act has been referred to as
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947. Since the Taft-Hartley Act is in reality a compromise amendment of
the Wagner Act, for purposes of this article I shall refer to the Wagner Act as the
National Labor Relations Act, and to the Taft-Hartley Act as the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended. From time to time I may refer to either or both of
them as "the act." If the dates of the enactment of each are kept in mind, the
words the act should have a definite meaning for the reader. Titles II and VII
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 make certain
additions to the Taft-Hartley Act. When reference is made to these additions
this act will be referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Bill.
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that the act was unconstitutional and would meet an early end at
the hands of the Supreme Court of the United States.5 The lawyers
did not speak without reason. The act was in apparent conflict with
some Supreme Court decisions limiting the federal government's
authority over interstate commerce, including one on which the ink
was scarcely dry. 6 Even the men who drafted and enacted the act
were dubious as to its constitutionality7 However, in an attempt to
avoid the "unconstitutional delegation of legislative power" that had
brought about the early demise of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, they placed the administration of the act in the hands of an
administrative agency known as the National Labor Relations Board
rather than in the hands of an industrial group, as had been the case
with the old NIRA; they set up standards to govern the exercise of
the power delegated to the National Labor Relations Board; and
they provided for judicial enforcement of the orders of the Board,
in contrast to the NIRA, which depended upon the sanction of
public approval. The act was virtually inoperative until the question of its constitutionality was resolved. There were two main
features raised in the constitutional test which took place: (1) Did
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution support the
exercise of federal jurisdiction; and (2) was the act consistent with
the requirements of due process of law?
On April 12, 1937, the Supreme Court decided the first five Board
cases to reach it. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.8 a fiveto-four vote upheld the constitutionality of the act. Indeed, the
Court gave the federal power over interstate commerce full sweep
and stated that Congress had power to control matters touching on
purely local industry beyond anything theretofore deemed permissible.
This case contained within it the seed which flowered into the doctrine of federal pre-emption enunciated in the Guss v. Utah LRB, 9
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,1° and Amalgamated
5The National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League.
6Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). This case came
to be known as the "sick chicken" case, and was the case which killed the National
Industrial Recovery Act.

This act was symbolized by the Blue Eagle in the

windows of many establishments.
72 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

ACT of 1935, 2302-

2411 (G.P.O. 1949).
8301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9353 U.S. 1 (1957).
10353 U.S. 26 (1957).
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Meat Cutters and Butchers v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.11 cases. When
the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947, Congress was on notice, from
the very case which decided the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act, of the scope and sweep of the federal power
under the commerce clause. Many people, including the author, complained bitterly that Mr. Taft and Mr. Hartley never could have
intended for this act to "occupy the field" to the exclusion of all
state power where the Labor Board had legal jurisdiction. Nevertheless, whatever may have been the actual intent of the Congress, its
legal intent must be ascertained with reference to the decided cases
on the books at the time of its passage. All legislative bodies are
conclusively presumed to be familiar with outstanding law when
they enact legislation. The decision of the Supreme Court in regard
to the doctrine of federal pre-emption finds sound legal justification
in the very act which enunciated the constitutionality of the Wagner
Act.
EXODUS

After the Supreme Court decision in Jones & Laughlin, the
National Labor Relations Board, which was the agency created by
the National Labor Relations Act, began to function. At that time
the NLRB consisted of three members appointed by the President
of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate. They
were charged with the administration of certain important features
of the Wagner Act.
The Wagner Act guaranteed to workers in industries engaged in
commerce, or industries "affecting commerce," the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
It enumerated five unfair labor practices that might be committed by
employers. There were no unfair labor practices enumerated that
might be committed by unions. In the political climate which prevailed in 1935, it was the policy of the United States Government,
and so declared in the statute, to place its weight on the side of
laboring men because of the theory that there was an imbalance between the power of the corporate structure, on the one hand, to buy
labor and the ability of the laboring man, on the other hand, to sell
his labor in the market as an individual. In other words, the theory
behind the act at that time was that the individual workers, when
S1353 U.S. 20 (1957).
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faced with the problem of bargaining within the modern capital
corporate structure, were in a helpless economic position, and that
the Government should throw its weight to their side for the purpose of guaranteeing them the right to organize so that they would
be able to bargain on a more equal basis with the modern forms
12
of employers.
To implement the right to organize and bargain collectively, the
Wagner Act did two main things: (1) it empowered the NLRB to
issue remedial orders, enforceable in the courts, to prevent commission of the five enumerated unfair labor practices by employers; (2)
it directed the NLRB to resolve what are known as "questions concerning representation" under section 9 of the act. A question concerning representation is nothing more nor less than does X union
represent Y's employees. The NLRB has devised election machinery
for determining this issue. However, as with many relatively simple
propositions, it became complex in application; for example, when
X union and Z union claimed to represent Y's employees, or when
the employees of Y after having voted for a union claimed that it
no longer represented them.
Further, the Board was early faced with the problem of resolving
what unit of employees was to be represented. A unit, as determined
by the NLRB, is the group of employees who are to be represented
by a union after it establishes its majority status. The NLRB early
held that it was the duty of the employer to recognize the majority
representative in a unit "appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining." To determine what unit would serve as the basis for
bargaining, it was necessary for the NLRB to weigh many factors
incapable of mathematical ascertainment but none the less real. For
example, was it appropriate that a group of highly skilled craftsmen
be placed in the same unit with unskilled laborers for purposes of
representation? Or could a collective bargaining representative be
expected to protect the interests of both craftsmen and unskilled
labor when its status as a representative depended upon a majority
vote and the majority were unskilled laborers? Could the representative be expected to sacrifice the economic interests of the smaller
skilled group in favor of the larger unskilled group? Could clerical
workers and teamsters be put in the same group without involving
l2For a detailed explanation, see Problems of Labor in a Free Society, an address by Joseph Alton Jenkins before the Labor Law Institute sponsored by the
College of Law of the University of Utah at Salt Lake City, Utah, May 2, 1959.
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a conflict of interests? Could supervisors who had authority to hire
and fire and who represented the employer on the job be placed in
the same unit with laborers? Could there be bargaining units of more
than one plant? When a corporation or a combination of financial
interests operated many plants under a common labor policy, would
a unit confined to one of the plants be appropriate? Would a unit
at all of the plants be appropriate? Could there be more than one
appropriate unit for bargaining purposes?
These questions, which at first reading appear to be relatively
simple, have been the subject of exposition and refinement by the
Board during the twenty-four years of its history. The Board is
vested with a wide discretion to determine what constitutes a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining purposes. This is necessary
because in a complex and interdependent society the factors which
come into play in determining what should be done are often incapable of verbal expression with any degree of exactitude, but
rather rest upon the sort of perception which comes from experience.
For example, no driver of an automobile could possibly by the use
of mathematics drive the car in relation to oncoming vehicles or
vehicles approaching from the side or behind. Yet most drivers are
able to ascertain at a glance whether they have time to pass a car
ahead of them without running head on into an onrushing car. This
process takes place so rapidly that it could scarcely be called a process
of analysis; it is an act of immediate perception. In certain realms
the same sort of perception or awareness is necessary to resolve issues
which can not be reduced to problems that would be given to an
IBM machine but really involve judgments requiring a delicate accommodation of values and of interests.
At the time of the passage of the Wagner Act there were approximately 2,500,000 members of labor unions in the United States. After
its passage, and under the impetus given to organization by the policy
of the federal government, unions grew rapidly. As of today, figures
show between fifteen and eighteen million members of labor unions.
The three-man board created by the Wagner Act did not operate
in a physical or legal vacuum. To carry out its functions, it hired a
staff of attorneys and other professional people in Washington, D. C.
It also established at various points throughout the United States
regional offices under the control of regional directors, where both
attorneys and field examiners were employed. It set up a division
of trial examiners to hear complaints involving unfair labor prac-
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tices, make intermediate reports, and recommend orders to the
Board. 13 .

As to the legal environment of the NLRB, the Board was faced
from the beginning with the question of which of its actions were
subject to judicial review, and the subsidiary question of the scope of
such review. The Supreme Court early decided that directions of
elections and certifications are not directly reviewable. 14 The Supreme
Court imposed upon itself and upon reviewing courts judicial restraint in substituting judicial judgment for the judgment of the
Board, especially in findings of fact for determination of questions
of mixed fact and law, such as the meaning of general statutory terms.
In relation to remedial orders in the field of unfair labor practices,
the Supreme Court early sustained the Board's power to
(1) forbid an employer to recognize an employer-dominated
organization as the representative of his employees; 1
(2) order an employer to reimburse employees for dues
checked off and paid over to the dominated organization;' 6
(3) order back pay for job applicants denied employment because of their union affiliations or sympathies;"
(4) ignore state unemployment benefits in calculating back
18
pay;
(5) change its method of calculating back pay from lump
sum to calendar quarters. 19
However, in an early case, the Supreme Court held that the Board
13A trial examiner should be distinguished from a field examiner in that a
trial examiner is one who hears and determines cases involving unfair labor
practices, while a field examiner investigates cases, or at times hears cases involving
questions concerning representation, but has no power to make or recommend
decisions.
1In re NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938).
15Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); NLRB v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 319 U.S. 50 (1943); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 312
U.S. 660 (1941); H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); NLRB v. Falk
Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940); NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,
308 U.S. 241 (1939); NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272 (1938);
NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
'OVirginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
17Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
'8NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
19NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
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had exceeded its powers in ordering an employer to reimburse Government relief agencies for sums paid to "8 (3)'s" (those discriminatorily discharged) and thereafter deducted from their gross pay.20
There have been some later cases dealing with the extent of the
Board's authority.21
By 1945 and 1946 the sickly child of 1935 had become so robust
and healthy and so active that shouts and screams were heard in
certain quarters to the effect that the Government's policy of throwing
its weight on the side of labor in order to rectify an imbalance was
no longer just or fair. In fact, some people had come to feel that
it was high time for the Government to discard its role of being a
statutory sponsor of organized labor and assume the role of a neutral
umpire. In any event, this opinion became sufficiently widespread
to lead Congress in 1947 to pass the Labor-Management Relations
Act, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. The Taft-Hartley
Act, which was passed over the veto of the President of the United
States, remained substantially unmodified until the passage of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, though
some modifications did take place between 1947 and 1959.22
In a certain sense, the Taft-Hartley Act was an amendment to
the Wagner Act. However, it consisted more of additions to that act
than actual amendment of many of its substantive terms. The rights
guaranteed to employees under section 7 of the act and the five unfair labor practices that might be committed by employers remained
substantially unchanged. However, six new unfair labor practices
which might be committed by unions or their agents were added. The
congressional debate indicates that it was the purpose of the Government to assume the role of a neutral umpire in relation to management, on the one hand, and labor unions, on the other hand. However, it should be noted that it is still the policy of the United States
to promote the "normal flow of commerce" by eliminating and
mitigating obstructions to the flow of commerce and by "encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargainingand by protecting
2ORepublic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
2lFor a review of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the powers and
duties of the NLRB, see Jenkins, The Supreme Court and the NLRB, 9 LAS. L. J.
425 (1938).
22Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended by Pub. L. No. 101,
80th Cong., Ist Sess. ch. 120 (June 23, 1947); Pub. L. No. 189, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess.
(Oct. 22, 1951); Pub. L. No. 85-791, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 28, 1958); LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
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the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection."23

Much of the confusion which has arisen in the interpretation of
the Taft-Hartley Act stems from the belief that the policy of promoting collective bargaining is an end in itself. A reading of the
"Short Title and Declaration of Policy," together with the "Findings
and Policies," clearly shows that the Government is concerned with
the "normal flow of commerce." This is to be brought about by encouraging collective bargaining within certain well-defined and specific limits. Certain inhibitions have been placed on labor unions;
these may not of themselves encourage organization of unions to
the greatest possible extent, but they foster collective bargaining
within limits that will accomplish, in the judgment of Congress, the
objective of achieving a "normal flow of commerce." Those who
believed that the major objective of the act was to promote collective
bargaining forgot, and sometimes still forget, that the collective bargaining process is the means toward the achievement of an end and
not an end in itself. The objective of the statute is to promote the
"normal flow of commerce." When it is clearly realized that collective
bargaining, subject to certain well-defined limitations, is the means
to the achievement of a larger end, it is much easier to analyze and
rationalize the decisions of the NLRB and of the courts in relation
to the interpretation of the act.
One new unfair labor practice has been added by the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. This addition
will require much interpretation and elucidating litigation. The
new unfair labor practice is referred to in the new act as section
8 (b) (7). As of today, section 7 and sections 8 (a) and 8 (b) of the
act, as amended, read in the manner set forth in Appendix A, which
is attached hereto to provide a convenient point of reference for the
discussion which is to follow.
From its birth, through its youth, and now in its maturity the
National Labor Relations Board has been the focal point for seething
and contending forces in the economic life of the nation. It has a
transcendent importance in our economic life that is not generally
realized. Because passions and prejudice run high in the field of labor
23"Findings and Policies," National Labor Relations Act §1, as amended, 61
STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §151 (1958). (Emphasis supplied.)
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relations, the Board has been forced to interpret and apply a highly
technical and complex law in an atmosphere of political turmoil ever
since its inception. Labor makes the NLRB its "whipping boy"
when anything goes wrong; management makes the NLRB its "whipping boy" when anything goes wrong.
During its history the Board has decided more cases than the
Supreme Court of the United States or any other judicial tribunal.
It has more litigation before the courts than any other independent
agency or executive department of the Government. During the
eleven years immediately following the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act, it handled over 169,000 cases. Its decisions have more effect
upon the operations of businesses and the rights of employees than
the decisions of any other independent agency. Yet the NLRB is
presently operated from a headquarters which it occupies from year
to year by the courtesy of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. Unlike the Federal Trade Commission or some other independent agencies, it does not even have its own building. Lawyers
working on the staff or board members are often forced to work two
and three to a room. Adequate secretarial help is not available, largely
because of lack of space in which to put them. Funds available to
hire needed personnel have had to be returned to Congress because
space was not available in which to place them.24
WHAT Is THE

NLRB

TODAY?

The National Labor Relations Board is a quasi-judicial, quasilegislative, and quasi-executive body consisting of five men appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The number was increased from three to five with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The members of the Board serve for a term of five years. "Any member of the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and
hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other
cause."

25

In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act created the office of independent general counsel. The general counsel is also appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. He is in no way dependent
upon the Board for his appointment or for security of tenure in his
24There are now throughout the nation 31 regional and subregional offices;
there are 1,470 employees - 913 in the field and 557 in Washington.
25National Labor Relations Act §3 (a), as amended, 61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §153 (a) (1958).
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position. No grounds or procedure for his removal are specified in
the statute. This has left open the question of whether his tenure is
subject to the pleasure of the President of the United States, or
whether he can be removed only for neglect of duty, malfeasance in
office, or other just cause. Some lawyers take one view and some
another. He discharges certain statutory functions conferred directly
upon him by the statute, and is vested with (1) the sole authority to
determine whether a complaint alleging the commission of unfair
labor practices shall issue, and (2) with general supervision of all
attorneys employed by the Board - other than trial examiners and
legal assistants to Board members - and of the officers and employees
in the regional office. The precise language of the act describing his
position is contained in section 3 (d) , which reads as follows:
"There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who shall
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. The General
Counsel of the Board shall exercise general supervision over
all attorneys employed by the Board (other than trial examiners and legal assistants to Board members) and over the
officers and employees in the regional offices. He shall have
final authority on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section
10, and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before
the Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may
prescribe or as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be noted that the Board may thus prescribe duties for the
general counsel by virtue of the authority of section 3 (d) . In actual
practice, however, the Board has largely delegated to the general
counsel increasing grants of power to act in its behalf in the field
of administration, reserving to itself the quasi-judicial and quasilegislative functions. The term Board is often used to refer to the
five members appointed by the President. The term Board is also
often used to designate the total agency, including all of its field
personnel - that is, to refer to it as an institution. The double
meaning in which this term is used often leads to confusion in the
public mind. Actions which properly fall within the province of
the general counsel are ascribed to the five members of the Board,
and vice versa. In any event, a proper understanding of the Board as
an institution requires that statutory authority conferred on the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

11

FloridaLABOR
Law Review,
Vol. 12, Iss. 4BOARD
[1959], Art. 2
RELATIONS
NATIONAL
general counsel be clearly understood; and, in addition, it is essential that the delegation of power to the general counsel to act "on
behalf of the Board" be comprehended. To that end, I feel that it
should be helpful to set forth below the current delegation to the
26
general counsel as it exists today.
"I. Case handling-A. Complaint cases. The General Counsel of
the Board has full and final authority and responsibility, on behalf
of the Board, to accept and investigate charges filed, to enter into
and approve informal settlement of charges, to dismiss charges, to
determine matters concerning consolidation and severance of cases
before complaint issues, to issue complaints and notices of hearing, to
appear before Trial Examiners in hearings on complaints and prosecute as provided in the Board's rules and regulations, and to initiate
and prosecute injunction proceedings as provided for in section 10
(1) of the act. After issuance of Intermediate Report by the Trial
Examiner, the General Counsel may file exceptions and briefs and
appear before the Board in oral argument, subject to the Board's rules
and regulations.
"B. Court litigation. The General Counsel of the Board is
authorized and has responsibility, on behalf of the Board, to seek
and effect compliance with the Board's orders and make such compliance reports to the Board as it may from time to time require.
"On behalf of the Board, the General Counsel of the Board will
in full accordance with the directions of the Board, petition for enforcement and resist petitions for review of Board orders as provided
in section 10 (e) and (f) of the act, initiate and prosecute injunction
proceedings as provided in section 10 (j), seek temporary restraining orders as provided in section 10 (e) and (f), and take appeals
either by writ of error or on petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court: Provided, however, That the General Counsel will initiate
and conduct injunction proceedings under section 10 (j) or under
section 10 (e) and (f) of the act and contempt proceedings pertaining to the enforcement of or compliance with any order of the Board
only upon approval of the Board, and will initiate and conduct ap26This statement of the powers delegated to the general counsel as of the
present date is, with the exception of section VII, identical in all respects with
that adopted by the Board and made effective by 20 Fed. Reg. 2175 (1955). Sec.
VII was amended by 23 Fed. Reg. 6966 (1958) and 24 Fed. Reg. 6666 (1959). The
full text of the delegation in its present form can be found in CCH LAB. L. REP.
ff1120.
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peals to the Supreme Court by writ of error or on petition for certiorari when authorized by the Board.
"C. Representationand other election cases. The General Counsel
of the Board is authorized and has responsibility, on behalf of the
Board to receive and process, in accordance with the decisions of the
Board and with such instructions and rules and regulations as may be
issued by the Board from time to time, all petitions filed pursuant
to section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act as amended. He is
also authorized and has responsibility to conduct secret ballots pursuant to section 209 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, whenever the Board is required to do so by law; and to enter
into consent election agreements in accordance with section 9 (c) (4)
of the act.
"The authority and responsibility of the General Counsel of the
Board in representation cases shall extend, in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Board, to all phases of the investigation
through the conclusion of the hearing provided for in section 9 (c)
and section 9 (e) (if a hearing should be necessary to resolve disputed issues), but all matters involving decisional action after such
hearing are reserved by the Board to itself.
"In the event a direction of election should issue by the Board,
the authority and responsibility of the General Counsel, as herein
prescribed, shall attach to the conduct of the ordered election, the
initial determination of the validity of challenges and objections to
the conduct of the election and other similar matters; except that
if appeals shall be taken from the General Counsel's action on the
validity of challenges and objections, such appeals will be directed
to and decided by the Board in accordance with such procedural
requirements as it shall prescribe. If challenged ballots would not
affect the election results and if no objections are filed within five
days after the conduct of a Board-directed election under the provisions of section 9 (c) of the act, the General Counsel is authorized
and has responsibility, on behalf of the Board, to certify to the parties
the results of the election in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Board.
"Appeals from the refusal of the General Counsel of the Board to
issue a notice of hearing on any petition, or from the dismissal by
the General Counsel of any petition will be directed to and decided
by the Board, in accordance with such procedural requirements as it
may prescribe.
"In processing election petitions filed pursuant to section 9 (e)
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of the act, the General Counsel of the Board is authorized and has
responsibility, on behalf of the Board, to conduct an appropriate
investigation as to the authenticity of the 30 percent showing referred
to and, upon making his determination to proceed, to conduct a
secret ballot. If there are no challenges or objections which require a
hearing by the Board, he shall certify the results thereof as provided
for in such section, with appropriate copies lodged in the Washington
files of the Board.
"D. Jurisdictional dispute cases. The General Counsel of the
Board is authorized and has responsibility, on behalf of the Board, to
perform all functions necessary to the accomplishment of the provisions of section 10 (k) of the act, but in connection therewith the
Board will, at the request of the General Counsel, assign to him for
the purpose of conducting the hearing provided for therein, one of
its staff Trial Examiners. This authority and responsibility and the
assignment of the Trial Examiner to the General Counsel shall
terminate with the close of the hearing. Thereafter the Board will
assume full jurisdiction over the matter for the purpose of deciding
the issues in such hearing on the record made and subsequent hearings or related proceedings and will also rule upon any appeals.
"II. Internal regulations. Procedural and operational regulations
for the conduct of the internal business of the Board within the area
that is under the supervision and direction of the General Counsel
of the Board may be prepared and promulgated by the General
Counsel.
"III. State agreements. When authorized by the Board, the General Counsel may initiate and conduct discussions and negotiations,
on behalf of the Board, with appropriate authorities of any of the
States or Territories looking to the consummation of agreements
affecting any of the States or Territories as contemplated in section
10 (a) of the act: Provided, however, That in no event shall the
Board be committed in any respect with regard to such discussions
or negotiations or the entry into of any such agreement unless and
until the Board and the General Counsel have joined with the appropriate authorities of the State or Territory affected in the execution of such agreement.
"IV. Liaison with other governmental agencies. The General
Counsel of the Board is authorized and has responsibility, on behalf
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of the Board, to maintain appropriate and adequate liaison and arrangements with the Office of the Secretary of Labor, with reference to
the reports required to be filed pursuant to section 9 (f) and (g) of
the act and availability to the Board and the General Counsel of
the contents thereof.
"The General Counsel of the Board is authorized and has responsibility, on behalf of the Board, to maintain appropriate and
adequate liaison with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
and any other appropriate Governmental Agency with respect to
functions which may be performed in connection with the provisions
of section 209 (b) of the act. Any action taken pursuant to the
authority and responsibility prescribed in the paragraph shall be
promptly reported to the Board. [This paragraph has become obsolete
by virtue of Article II of the Landrum-Griffin Bill, but as of the date
this article was written no formal action had been taken to amend
this portion of the delegation.]
"V. Anti-communist affidavits. The General Counsel of the Board
is authorized and has responsibility, on behalf of the Board, to
receive the affidavits required under section 9 (h) of the act, to
maintain an appropriate and adequate file thereof, and to make available to the public, on such terms as he may prescribe, appropriate
information concerning such affidavits, but not to make such files
open to unsupervised inspection. [This paragraph has become obsolete
by virtue of Article II of the Landrum-Griffin Bill, but as of the date
this article was written no formal action had been taken to amend
this portion of the delegation.]
"VI. Miscellaneous litigation involving board and/or officials.
The General Counsel of the Board is authorized and has responsibility, on behalf of the Board, to appear in any court to represent
the Board or any of its Members or agents, unless directed otherwise
by the Board.
"VII. 1. In order more fully to release the Board to the expeditious performance of its primary function and responsibility of
deciding cases, the full authority and responsibility for all administrative functions of the Agency shall be vested in the General Counsel.
This authority shall be exercised subject to the limitations contained
in paragraph 2 with respect to the personnel of, or directly related
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to, Board Members, and shall be exercised in conformity with the
requirements for joint determination as described in paragraph 4.
"2. The General Counsel shall exercise full and final authority
on behalf of the Agency over the selection, retention, transfer, promotion, demotion, discipline, discharge and in all other respects, of
all personnel engaged in the field and in the Washington Office (other
than personnel in the Board Members' offices, the Division of Trial
Examiners, the Division of information, the Security Office, the Office
of the Solicitor, and the Office of the Executive Secretary) ; provided,
however, that the establishment, transfer or elimination of any Regional or Sub-Regional Office shall require the approval of the Board.
"3. The General Counsel will provide such administrative services
and housekeeping services as may be requested by the Board in connection with the conduct of its necessary business, and will submit to
the Board a quarterly report on the performance of these administrative functions.
"4. In connection with and in order to effectuate the foregoing,
the General Counsel is authorized to formulate and execute such
necessary requests, certifications, and other related documents on behalf of the Agency, as may be needed from time to time to meet the
requirements of Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget,
or any other Governmental Agency; provided, however, that the total
amount of any annual budget requests submitted by the Agency, the
apportionment and allocation of funds and/or the establishment of
personnel ceilings within the Agency shall be determined jointly
by the Board and the General Counsel.
"VIII. To the extent that the above-described duties, powers and
authority rest by statute with the Board, the foregoing statement constitutes a prescription and assignment of such duties, powers and
authority, whether or not so specified."
The dichotomy resulting from having a Board of five members
who are presidential appointees and an independent general counsel
who is also a presidential appointee has led to many interesting situations which have been the subject of comment in the newspapers and
of much debate but which are hardly appropriate for an article of
this nature. This is a domain that more properly belongs to the
Congress; and the Board, as a "creature of the Congress" should be
mindful of the wishes of its creator.
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ORGANIZATIONAL AND RECOGNITION PICKETING

It has been noted above that section 704 (c) of the LandrumGriffin Bill adds subsection (7) to section 8 (b) of the Taft-Hartley
Act. This makes it an unfair labor practice for a union not currently
certified to picket or threaten to picket when an object is to gain
recognition or to promote organization of the employees under any
of the following circumstances:
(1) The employer has lawfully recognized another union.
(2) A valid representation election has been held within the
preceding twelve months.
(3) The picketing has been conducted without a petition
"being filed within a reasonable period of time not to
exceed thirty days ...."
Under (3) there is no need for a showing of interest on the part
of the union; and perhaps picketing beyond the thirty-day period or
other publicity addressed to the public and consumers is permitted,
providing the effect of the picketing is not to induce a disruption of
services at the employer's place of business, and perhaps elsewhere.
This area of legislation is unquestionably the most difficult and
complex of all. Serious questions are raised. What effect do the new
section 8 (b) (7) provisions have on the Curtis doctrine? The Curtis
doctrine stands for the proposition that when the NLRB has conducted a valid election to which no legitimate objections have been
filed, and subsequently there is picketing to force recognition in the
face of the Board's certification that the picketing union does not
represent the employees involved, this picketing amounts to a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The finding by
the Board of a violation in Curtis Brothers, Inc.2 7 rested on the fact

that continued picketing restrained and coerced employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the act in that they had
already indicated in a Board-conducted election their desire not to
be represented by the union in question. With the passage of section
8 (b) (7) the question was immediately raised as to whether the Board
should proceed with the Curtis case, which is, as of the time of writing
27Local 639, Teamsters Union v. NLRB

(Curtis Brothers, Inc.), 43 LAB. REL.

REP. (43 L.R.R.M.) 2156 (D.C. Cir. 1958), reversing 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1958),
cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965 (1959), U.S. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 34 (1959-60 Term).
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this article, currently pending on writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the United States. The Board had decided to proceed,
though not without some disagreement among its members. The
House managers of the new legislation made the statement that section
8 (b) (7) overrules the Curtis and Alloy Mfg. Co.2s cases to the extent
that these decisions are inconsistent with section 8 (b) (7). At the
time this statement was made, both Curtis and Alloy had been overruled by the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and for
the Ninth Circuit, respectively. Furthermore, the language of section
8 (b) (7) specifically provides that "nothing in this paragraph (7)
shall be construed to permit any act which would otherwise be an
unfair labor practice under this section 8 (b)." This language can
be rationalized only if it is assumed that the House managers were
referring to the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in the Curtis case and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in the Alloy case, both of which cases overruled the
Board. This view is reinforced when the ruling of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the O'Sullivan Rubber Co. case, 29 affirming the
Board's finding of a violation of 8 (b) (1) (a), is examined.
The above is merely one of the many questions presented by
section 8 (b) (7). For instance, if a union really represents a majority
of the employees in an appropriate unit but desires, for strategic reasons, to secure an immediate election without making the usual
thirty per cent showing of interest or without a determination by
the Board of the appropriateness of the unit, should any question be
raised? May the union, merely by putting up a picket line and filing
a petition, secure an immediate election to which it would not otherwise be entitled? Should the Board interpret this action so as to
allow unions to secure immediate elections in the face of a legislative history indicating that it was this action which was to outlaw
"blackmail picketing"? Should the Board utilize its rule-making
power under section 6 of the act to give full scope to the legislative
intent by requiring that a charge be filed alleging violation of section
28NLRB v. International Ass'n of Machinists, AFL-CIO, 263 F.2d 796, 265 F.2d
289 (9th Cir. 1959), enforcing in part and setting aside in part 119 N.L.R.B. 507
(1957), petition for cert. filed Apr. 24, 1959, U.S. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 57 (195960 Term).
29NLRB v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers, AFL-CIO,
Local 511 (O'Sullivan Rubber Corp.), 44 LAB. REL. REP. 2465 (4th Cir. 1959), enforcing 121 N.L.R.B. No. 185 (1958), petition for cert. filed Aug. 17, 1959, U.S.
Sup. Ct. Docket No. 316 (1959-60 Term).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol12/iss4/2

18

Jenkins: What Is the National Labor Relations Board?

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

8 (b) (7) before holding an immediate election? Would such a provision in its rules serve to accomplish the intent of Congress? Further, suppose a union is picketing for recognition in an inappropriate
unit; should the Board hold the election in a unit which is inappropriate for purposes of collective bargaining and then proceed for
injunction regardless of the outcome of the election? If the inappropriate unit were very small and an appropriate unit were very
large, could the Board forthwith proceed to an election in the larger
unit? The questions are multitudinous and will require all the
legal imagination and administrative ingenuity that the Board
possesses.
WHAT WILL THE

NLRB BE ToioRRow?

At the outset of this article, the statement was made that the
National Labor Relations Board was at the high point of its history.
By this phrase it was meant that it was facing a challenge which it
must meet. The challenge is serious and great. It must solve the
problems that have been posed by Supreme Court decisions and
congressional enactments in a manner that will be satisfactory to the
American people. No law retains its vitality, nor can it long survive,
unless the majority of the citizens affected by that law are willing to
comply with it, and understand and support it. In our complex and
interdependent society, the achieving of public understanding is
perhaps the most difficult problem. To that end we must endeavor
to shape our decisions in such a manner that persons of average ability
and education will comprehend and understand them and feel that
they are just. History is replete with examples of what happens to
nations, institutions, judicial systems, and other forms of social organizations when they fail to meet the demands and the needs of the
people they were designed to serve. Will the NLRB be able to
meet its present challenge? Will it be able to continue to play a vital
role in the life of the country? Will it be able, within its own sphere,
to accommodate the rights of individuals, employers, and employees,
on the one hand, and the demands of the public welfare, on the
other hand, in such a manner as to render it an institution of value
in the public mind? The jury is the American people, and the verdict
rests with them.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 2
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A
"RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
"SEC. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).
"UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
"SEC. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7;
"(2) to dominate or interfere with the information or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the
Board pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of
time or pay;
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or any other
statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in section 8 (a) of this Act, as an unfair labor practice)
to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after
the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective
date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization
is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the
appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made;
and (ii) unless following an election held, as provided in Section 9 (e)
within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement the Board
shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote
in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall
justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor
organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members or (B) if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other
than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
"(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act;
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" (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a).
" (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents "(I) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the
selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances;
" (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (2) (3) or to discriminate against
an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender
the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition
of acquiring or retaining membership;
"(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is
the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9 (a);
"(4)
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii)
to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is:
" (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to
join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement
which is prohibited by section 8 (e);
" (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees
unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 9: Provided, That nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where
not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
"(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain
with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees
if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 9;
" (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to
employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade,
craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or
in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform
to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining
representative for employees performing such work:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed
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to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any
employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer
are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act: Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary
dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity
does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person
other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to
pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the
establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution."
"(5) to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized under
subsection (2) (3) the payment, as a condition precedent to becoming a
member of such organization, of a fee in an amount which the Board finds
excessive or discriminatory under all the circumstances. In making such a
finding, the Board shall consider, among other relevant factors, the practices and customs of labor organizations in the particular industry, and the
wages currently paid to the employees affected;
"(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or
agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value in the nature of
an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed;
and
"(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause
to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as
the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees
of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective
bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified
as the representative of such employees:
"(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with
this Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9 (c) of this Act,
"(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election
under section 9 (c) of this Act has been conducted, or
"(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under section 9 (c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not
to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, that when such a petition has been filed and Board shall forthwith,
without regard to the provisions of section 9 (c) (I) or the absence of a
showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization,
direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and
shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this
subparagraph (c) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other
publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including
consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a
contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is
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to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course
of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or
not to perform any services.
"Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act
which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section
(8) (b)."
"(c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.
"(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect
a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting
commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such
contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such
termination or modification " (1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the
proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date
thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty
days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;
" (2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of
negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
"(3)
notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within
thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously
therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and
conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred,
provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and
"(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or
lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period
of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such
contract, whichever occurs later:
The duties imposed upon employers, employees and labor organizations by
paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall become inapplicable upon an intervening
certification of the Board, under which the labor organization or individual,
which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the
representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 9 (a),
and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party
to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained
in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective
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before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of
the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day
period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the
employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections
8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer.
"(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from
handling, using, selling transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the
products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter
containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void:
Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting,
or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Provided further, That for
the purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8 (b) (4) (B) the terms 'any
employer,' 'any person engaged in commerce' or 'an industry affecting commerce,' and 'any person' when used in relation to the terms 'any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,' 'any other employer,' or 'any other person'
shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor,
or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer
or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and
clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit
the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception."
"(0 It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b)
of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon
their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry
with a labor organization of which building and construction employees are
members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in
section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the majority
status of such labor organization has not been established under the provisions
of section 9 of this Act prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such
agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor
organization after the seventh day following the beginning of such employment
or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities
for employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement
specifies minimum training or experience qualifications for employment or
provides for priority in opportunities for employment based upon length of
service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular geographical
area: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall set aside the final proviso
to section 8 (2) (3) of this Act: Provided further, That any agreement which
would be invalid but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a
petition filed pursuant to section 9 (c) or 9 (e)."

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol12/iss4/2

24

